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INTRODUCTION
In this brief, the parties and key witnesses will be
referred to as follows:
"Mr. Onyeabor" —
Emmanuel Onyeabor, the plaintiff,
age 29 at the time of the accident;
a native of Nigeria.
"Liz Onyeabor" —
"Mrs. Bates" —

The wife of Emmanuel Onyeabor.

Pam Bates, one of the defendants, and
wife of the owner of the corporate
defendant, Pro Roofing, Inc.

"Pro Roofing" — Pro Roofing, Inc., a Utah corporation,
owned in part by Phil Bates, husband of
Pam Bates.
"Dr. Clark" -- Lincoln Clark, M.D., a psychiatrist at
the University of Utah who testified
on behalf of the defense.
Other witnesses will be identified in the context of the argument
presented.
The record will be referred to as "(R.

)."

References to the transcript will be designated as "(T. M-

),"

using the clerk's volume reference (19 volumes, A through S) and
the reporter's page numbers. When certain lines on a page are
referenced, for example Volume D, page 126, lines 3-14, this
format will be used:
referred to as

"Ex.

"(T. D-126:3-14)."

Exhibits will be

," and pages within exhibits as "Ex.

38:1, 5, 8," to refer to pages 1, 5 and 8 of Exhibit 38.
The Appendix will be abbreviated as "App." Some
important sections of transcript and frequently referred-to
exhibits are attached in the separately-bound Appendix.

viii

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
by virtue of Utah Code Ann. 1953 §78-2a-3(h) (1987) and Utah Code
Ann. 1953 §78-2-2(3)(i) and (4)(g) (1987).

This is an appeal

from a district court directly to the Utah pupreme Court, which
has been "poured over" to the Court of Appeals.

NATURE OF PROCEEDING BFLOW AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant in this case, Emmanuel Onyeabor, filed an
action in Third District Court of Salt Lake County based upon
personal injuries that he received in an automobile accident that
occurred on June 15, 1984.

Mr. Onyeabor sustained a closed-head,

organic brain injury as well as a herniated lumbar disc.

The

case was tried to a jury beginning February 2, 1987, and
continuing through February 18, 1987, when the jury returned a
verdict in favor of plaintiff, but awarding only the sum of
$16,850.00.

The verdict was reduced by 251% due to a finding of

contributory negligence on the part of Mr. Onyeabor (R. 658). A
motion for a new trial and for an additur were both denied on
April 1, 1987 (R. 720-1).

This appeal was timely taken from the

Judgment on Jury Verdict and the Order denying the Motion for a
New Trial and Additur with Notice of Appeal being filed on April
30, 1987 (R. 722).

ix

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the court make comments oh the evidence which

indicated a preference for the defendant's side of the case?
2.

Did the trial court comment oh the evidence by

exhibiting a hostile, negative attitude toward Mr. Onyeaborfs
case by means of its demeanor, facial expressions, tone of voice,
and harsh manner in addressing plaintiff's counsel?
3.

Should the court have excluded the surprise

testimony of Dr. Lincoln Clark, a psychiatrist, where notice of
this expert witness was not submitted to Mr, Onyeabor until six
(6) business days prior to trial?
4.

Did the court erroneously exclude other relevant

5.

Did the court commit reversible error by

evidence?

instructing the jury that it could find Mr. Onyeabor to be
contributorily negligent where the evidence was insufficient to
establish his failure to keep a proper lookout or to drive at a
safe speed under the conditions?
6.

Was there insufficient evidence to justify a

verdict for the defendants that Mr. Onyeabotf was 25% negligent,
and that his total damages amounted to only $16,850.00?
7.

Did the court abuse its discretion in failing to

grant plaintiff's Motions for an Additur or New Trial?
8.

Though some errors individually might not be

grounds for reversal, did the collective weight of the numerous
errors in this case deny plaintiff a fair trial?

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A.

DETAILS OF THE ACCIDENT

On June 15, 1984, plaintiff was employed as a
carpenter on a construction project in Midvale, Utah.

He was

traveling home for lunch at approximately 1:10 to 1:20 p.m.
(T. 1-81), proceeding north on 900 East, approximately 250 to 300
feet from the intersection of 7100 South (T. C-115-117, K-49:20;
Ex. 5). The posted speed limit was 45 mph and he was traveling
approximately 40 to 45 mph (T. B-58; 1-81).
The defendant, Pam Bates, had just stopped at a bank
in a shopping center on the east side of 900 East and was on her
way to perform an errand for her husband's company, defendant Pro
Roofing.

She intended to leave some papers at Pro Roofing, which

required her to travel westbound on 7100 South (T. L-14-15).
Ninth East is a four-lane highway divided by a median
strip.

It has two lanes northbound and a left-hand turn lane for

westbound traffic, which begins approximately 100 feet from the
white lines marking the crosswalk of the intersection (Exs. 1, 4).
There is also a right-hand turn lane which begins slightly south
of the point where defendant's vehicle entered the roadway (Ex.
1).
Mrs. Bates' vehicle pulled to the edge of 900 East and
stopped to observe the traffic (T. L-16), while she looked in a
southerly direction.

At that time, her vehicle would have been

situated approximately ten feet to the north of the telephone

pole shown in Exhibit 4, pictures A, B, I and Jf with the front
of the vehicle pointed almost due west (T. £-53).

She was

intending to make a left turn (i.e., westbound) onto 7100 South,
approximately 100 feet to her north at that moment.

She drove

directly across the three traffic lanes (the right-hand turn lane
and the two northbound lanes) at almost a right angle in order to
get into the left-hand turn lane on 900 East (T. B-50, K-49-.12
and C-108:12), so that she could turn west.
The Bates1 vehicle was struck by Mr. Onyeabor's vehicle
a few feet north of the "hash marks" on the road as shown on
Exhibit 4, photographs C, D, E, K and L (T. C-74-75).

Mrs. Bates

indicated to the investigating officer that she didn't see the
plaintiff's vehicle "because of a white truck" (Ex. 2; T. B-47).
The plaintiff's vehicle skidded approximately 105 feet (Exs. 2,
5A).

The turn in the skid was intended to show the relative

location of the point of impact (T. B-56; Ex. 5A). This would
indicate approximately 60 feet of skid priori to the impact and 45
feet after impact (T. C-113:6).
The right side of the plaintiff's vehicle impacted the
left rear bumper of the Bates' vehicle at the door joint (T.
C-69), causing plaintiff to lurch violently forward (T. C-122).
The place where the bumper of the Bates' vehicle "hooked" into
the side of the plaintiff's vehicle is shown in Exhibit 2,
pictures B, C and D.

Mr. Onyeabor testified that his left wheels

also struck the median strip causing him to be jostled severely
(T. C-118-119, 122) and causing tire damage (Ex. 8). He also
lost the steering wheel momentarily at approximately the time of

3

impact (T. 1-84), causing his body to be a "free object" in
motion inside the car (T. C-122:12-25).
Mr. Onyeabor testified that his head struck the
steering wheel and/or parts or the left top interior of the
vehicle (T. 1-84).

The position in which Mr. Onyeabor, a large

man, was sitting in this particular vehicle lend strong support
to that theory, as shown by Exhibit 3, photographs A through I,
particularly photograph K.
Based upon the testimony of Dennis Andrews (a former
highway patrolman and an accident reconstruction expert), it was
estimated that Mr. Onyeabor's vehicle was traveling at
approximately 28 to 33 mph at the time of impact.

Mr. Andrews

estimated the Bates' vehicle to be going north at approximately 5
mph (T. C-108), and Mrs. Bates estimated her speed at "under 10
mph" (T. L-17).

This means that the speed differential of the

vehicles was approximately 23 to 29 mph at impact (T. C-108).
Officer Leavitt estimated Mr. Onyeabor's vehicle to have a speed
of 15 to 20 mph at impact for a speed differential of 10 to 15
mph (T. C-64).

Both of these gentlemen were of the opinion that

this would probably cause Mr. Onyeabor to strike his head on the
steering wheel with some significant force (T. C-72 and C-122).
B.

COMMENTS ON THE EVIDENCE

The court made numerous prejudicial comments on the
evidence in at least the following respects:

the court expressed

opinions on the believability of expert witnesses and the quality
of the evidence; the court questioned witnesses; the court made
prejudicial statements regarding the use of exhibit notebooks by
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the juryf in front of the jury, which tended to cast the
documentary evidence in the case in a negative light; the court
allowed counsel to argue the admissibility or non-admissibility
of evidence in front of the jury, during which argumentation
prejudicial comments were made by the defense; the court made
extraneous prejudicial statements in ruling on the admissibility
of certain evidence, which was prejudicial; the court unduly
limited Mr. Onyeaborfs cross-examination of witnesses; and the
court repeatedly interrupted counsel and witnesses without cause
and made numerous prejudicial comments in so doing (see Tables T
and II below).

These facts are discussed in more detail in Point

I below with numerous additional citations to the record.
From the very outset of the case, there was an attitude
of distrust and prejudice exhibited toward Mr. Onyeabor and his
counsel.

This attitude was reflected in the court's demeanor

including facial expressions, sighs, frowns, and body language
(Apps. 36-39).

This attitude was also shown by the frequent

refusal to allow counsel to approach the bench on important
issues (T. B-46, C-76, 1-103).

In general, the court was very

harsh with Mr. Onyeabor's counsel in front of the jury,
particularly during the first three days of trial (T. D-443-444).
C.

FACTS REGARDING DR. LINCOLN CLARK

During the course of the litigation of this case, there
were five separate trial dates set:

8/14/85, 4/18/86, 11/17/86,

12/8/86 and 2/2/87 (R. 18, 100, 124, 199, 302). Mr. Onyeabor•s
current counsel entered the case in July of 1986, and promptly
amended the complaint, setting forth the issue of brain injury
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and damages more precisely (R. 145). Since the trial was at that
point scheduled for November 17f 1986 (R. 124 ) f the defense
immediately moved for an independent mental examination of the
plaintiff under Rule 35, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, with the
examination to be performed by Edward C. Beck, Ph.D., a
psychologist (R. 155). Dr. Beck apparently got sick, so on
November 8, 1986, defendants again moved for a continuance of the
trial (R. 252). That motion stated the following regarding the
planned efforts to obtain a new defense expert:
The undersigned further represents that he
will use all reasonable efforts to obtain
the services of a substitute expert as
rapidly as possible consistent with an
adequate presentation of the case. The
undersigned further represents that he will
use all reasonable efforts to cooperate with
plaintifff s attorney in providing an
opportunity to him to discover the substance
of the expert's evaluation and opinion.
(Emphasis added)
(R. 255). On November 10, 1986, the Motion for Continuance was
heard, and the court continued the trial until December 8, 1986
(R. 199).
During that period, the defendants procured a
substitute expert, Dr. Lincoln Clark, a University of Utah
psychiatrist.

For some reason, Dr. Clark was not able to examine

Mr. Onyeabor until December 2, 1986 (T. L-88).

After his

examination, Dr. Clark told defense counsel that he was
frightened by Mr. Onyeabor, and that he did not wish to
participate any further and would categorically not be a witness
at the trial (T. S-19).

Dr. Clark admitted that he had not been

threatened by Mr. Onyeabor; he was simply fearful (T. S-18:6).
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Defendants moved for a continuance, which was
strenuously opposed by Mr. Onyeabor because of his medical and
psychological condition (T. 3-19-21).

Dr. Clark was thereafter

summoned before the court on December 5, 1986, and examined on
the record by Judge Dee.

Dr. Clark testified that he would not

under any circumstances testify at trial and that his decision
was final and irrevocable.

He stated:

••• I've already expressed I want out of this.
I mean I made that very clear at the
beginning. And I regret the inconvenience
and everything else it has caused, and I wish
it could be otherwise. I would otherwise be
happy to proceed even with this short notice
involved — that's involved. But I simply —
and I say I thought about this very seriously
before T came to this conclusion because I
had a certain reputation — myselfc, I'm
concerned about as a witness, and I don't
want to compromise that, but I am not about
to take, as I look at it, an unreasonable
risk to myself and my family and the
apprehensions this could cause. Knd I'm not
going to change my mind. (Emphasis added)
(T. S-18-19).
Based upon these circumstances, Jkidge Dee reluctantly
ordered a fourth continuance of the trial to allow the defendants
to procure yet another substitute expert witness in the head
injury area to replace Dr. Clark (T. S-26-27).

On December 16,

1986, Mr. Stegall confirmed to Mr. Onyeabor's counsel that the
defense expert would be Dr. Robert Cook.

On December 17, 1986,

the parties appeared before Judge Dee for a scheduling
conference, and the new trial date of February 2, 1987, was set
(R. 302). Mr. Onyeabor was examined by Dr. Cook in Salt Lake
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City, in mid-January (T. K-89), and his deposition was
pre-scheduled with counsel for Monday, January 26, 1987, in
Denver (App. 40, p. 3).
On Thursday, January 22, 1987, exactly six business
days prior to trial, Mr. Onyeabor's counsel received a revised
witness list from Mr. Stegall (R. 308), which included Dr.
Lincoln Clark as a proposed witness!

This was the first notice

that Mr. Onyeabor had regarding the possibility that Dr. Clark
would again be a witness since the time of his "irrevocable11
withdrawal from the case on December 5, 1986.

Mr. Stegall was

out of town from Friday, January 23, 1987, until Tuesday, January
27, 1987.
It was difficult to schedule a Motion in Limine because
Judge Dee was retiring effective January 31, 1987, and he felt
that the judge assigned to trial should hear any such motions.
The first opportunity to schedule a motion before Judge Croft was
Friday, January 30, 1987, and Judge Croft denied the Motion in
Limine (R. 326? T. Q-54).
At the hearing on the Motion in Limine, Mr. Stegall
indicated that he had known about Dr. Clark's availability since
"the first part of January" (T. Q-38).

Dr. Clark testified at

trial that he decided to come back into the case some time around
Christmas 1986 (T. L-127-128).

Nothing about the possibility of

Dr. Clark's reappearance was ever communicated to plaintiff's
counsel despite many opportunities (App. 40).
Mr. Onyeabor's counsel did not receive a written report
from Dr. Clark on the results of his examination until the third
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day of trial, February 4, 1987.

The report was incomplete in

that it did not render a diagnosis of Mr. Onyeabor (App. 41:7).
Dr. Clark testified convincingly at trial (L-76-80,
91-3, 94, 96-97, 103-104, 156-158, 192-193), rendering an opinion
that Mr. Onyeabor suffered numerous pre-existing psychological
problems (T. L-192-193).
These facts are further amplified in Point II below.
D.

FACTS REGARDING THE EVIDENCE

The facts relevant to the evidentiary errors are as
follows:
The court excluded Exhibit 114, a video tape of a
crash, relevant to show the probability of head injury (T. C-146,
122-128), despite significant testimony that the tape illustrated
the principle of sudden deceleration (T. C-124-126).

On several

occasions, the court prohibited or seriously hindered counsel
from establishing scientific treatises as authoritative, or using
them in cross-examination of defense witnesses (T. M-32-36,
37-39, 49-53; D-444-445, 452; F-841-842).

The court excluded the

testimony of important rebuttal witnesses Cf. M-97-102).

The

court refused to allow Mr. Onyeaborfs wife to render important
testimony regarding his future plans which was relevant to lost
earning capacity (T. J-143).

The court refused to allow Officer

Leavitt to testify as to who was at fault in causing the accident
(T. B-59-62). The court excluded Exhibit 75, a purchase order,
offered to show that Mr. Onyeabor had a substantial business in
Nigeria, and therefore had lost substantial earning capacity due
to the accident (T. G-152).

Additional facts having to do with

these evidentiary matters are discussed below in Point III.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The court repeatedly commented on the evidence

throughout the trial.

Many of the comments on the evidence came

in the form of direct statements that indicated the court's view
on the quality or credibility of the evidence, and favored the
position of the defendants.

The court also interrupted and

interjected comments in such a manner as to indicate the court's
attitude towards the merits of the cause.

The court's demeanor,

including facial expressions, body language, tone of voice,
harshness towards plaintiff's counsel, and other similar things,
indicated that the court disbelieved Mr. Onyeabor's witnesses and
was hostile to Mr. Onyeabor's case.

The cumulative effect of

these actions was severely prejudicial and constituted reversible
error.
2.

Dr. Lincoln Clark, a University of Utah

psychiatrist, was hired as a defense expert witness but later
stated that he was withdrawing irrevocably from the case.
not write a report and was not deposed.
another expert.

He did

Defendants procured

Six business days before the new trial date, Dr.

Clark's name was again submitted as an expert; his written report
was not provided until the third day of trial.

Plaintiff did not

have time to do discovery on Dr. Clark's opinion and his presence
in the case was highly prejudicial to plaintiff.
3.

The court excluded several significant pieces of

evidence which affected the outcome of the case.
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For example,

the court refused Exhibit 114, a video tape showing an automobile
crash at 5 and 21 mph, wherein the "dummy" driver in each case
struck its head on the windshield hard enough to make a
significant bulls-eye breakage pattern.

This could have helped

to disprove defense claims that this accident was too mild to
cause the brain injury complained of by Mr. Onyeabor.

Other

significant evidence was also excluded.
4.

There was no evidence that Mr. Onyeabor was in any

way negligent, or contributed to the cause of the accident.

The

court nevertheless instructed the jury that it could find Mr.
Onyeabor contributorily negligent on the theory that he might
have been driving too fast for conditions, or might have failed
to maintain a proper lookout.

As a result, the jury was confused

and found Mr. Onyeabor 25% negligent.
5.

The verdict finding 25% negligence on the part of

the plaintiff and awarding only $16,850.00 in damages was the
result of passion and prejudice.

Mr. Onyeabor undisputedly

received a herniated disc from the accident, and there was no
substantial admissible evidence to contest the fact that he had a
brain injury with significant impairment resulting therefrom.
The court should have granted an additur in the amount of at
least $300,000.00, or, in the alternative, a new trial.
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POINT I.

Comments On The Evidence Prejudiced The Jury
IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO COMMENT
ON THE EVIDENCE EITHER DIRECTLY BY ORAL STATEMENTS OR
INDIRECTLY IN THE FORM OF ITS DEMEANOR, FACIAL
EXPRESSIONS, AND THE LIKE. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF
REPEATED INTERJECTIONS BY THE COURT WITH RESPECT TO THE
QUALITY OR BELIEVABILITY OF THE EVIDENCE CONSTITUTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Court shall not comment on the evidence in the case ..."

"The

It is

error for the court to comment on the quality or credibility of
the evidence in such a way as to indicate that it favors the
claims or the position of either party.

State v. Sanders, 27

Utah 2d 354, 496 P.2d 70 (1972); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 493 at
496 (Hall, C.J. concurring and dissenting) (Utah 1986).
Justice Hall stated the rule and its basis as follows:
[A] trial judge is not permitted to comment
on the quality or credibility of the
evidence and may not indicate that the
evidence is either weak or convincing. ...
The court is ... enjoined from commenting on
the quality or credibility of the evidence in
such a way as to indicate that it favors the
claims or position of either party. The
enjoinder is necessary to prevent any
intrusion upon the prerogatives of the jury
to judge the credibility of the evidence and
to determine the facts. (Concurring and
dissenting opinion) (Emphasis added)
Id. at 496.
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Chief

If the error was of sufficiently substantial a nature
that it is reasonable to believe that it adversely affected the
appellant or deprived him of a fair trial ih such a way that in
the absence of the error there is reasonably likelihood that the
outcome would have been different, reversal is warranted.

Del

Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 8 U , 814 (1972); Matter
of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 96 (Utah 1985).
Direct statements by a judge can obviously constitute
comments on the evidence.

The court's demeanor, however,

including facial expressions, gestures and actions, can also
amount to a comment on the evidence.

Fgede^-Nissen v. Crystal

Mountain, Inc., 606 P.2d 1214 at 1222 (Wash. 1980).

Furthermore,

if either a statement or an action can be reasonably interpreted
to indicate the court's belief or disbelief concerning the
veracity of witnesses, it falls in the category of a comment on
the evidence.

Jd.. Comments made during a trial which influence

the jury concerning the merits of the case, or which affect
substantial rights of litigants, constitute grounds for reversal.
Messier v. Simmons Gun Specialties, Inc., 687 P.2d 121 at 129
(Okla. 1984).
Interjections and interruptions n^ay constitute a
comment on the evidence, particularly wherd they occur or are
"phrased in a manner indicative of the count's attitude towards
the merits of the case ..."

Egede-Nissen, supra at 1222. The

cumulative effect of repeated interjection$ by the court or
comments on the evidence may constitute reversible error, even
though each such interjection, standing alc^ne, might not be error.
Egede-Nissen, supra at 1223.
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ARGUMENT
- Introduction The allegation that a trial court prejudicially
interjected itself into a trial should not be lightly made; nor
when made, should it be slighted by a reviewing court.
Eqede-Nissen, supra at 1221.
are not lightly made.

The allegations made in this case

Tn nearly 14 years of practice, counsel

has never encountered a situation such as that which occurred in
this trial.

The arguments made herein, though strong, should not

be viewed as a personal attack on the trial court.

The sad

events which transpired in this trial undoubtedly were not
consciously intended to cause damage to Mr. Onyeabor.
Nonetheless, the incidents occurred as reported herein and cannot
be ignored if justice is to be done.
There was potential for prejudice in this case from the
outset, even under the best of intentions.

For example, the

possibility of racial prejudice on the part of the jury was
strong, regardless of attempts to guard against it.
is black and foreign.

Mr. Onyeabor

He was a citizen of the African country of

Nigeria and spoke with an accent.

He was married to a Caucasian

woman, Liz Onyeabor, who was an important witness for him; she
was eight months pregnant at the time of the trial.

It is highly

unlikely that the average jury venire would admit racial
prejudices in an open courtroom on voir dire.

It was, therefore,

extremely important that the court itself make every effort to
avoid any appearance of prejudice or bias.
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- The Judge's Comments On The Belidvability And
Quality of Expert Testimony Prejudijced The Jury One author recently commented on tjhe importance of a
judge at trial as follows:
To whom does a jury look first fort guidance
in the course of a trial? The trijal judge,
of course. Everyone knows that lawyers can't
be trusted and the parties have axes to
grind. But the judge is impartial!. The
judge is knowledgeable. The judg^ wears a
robe! The judge is the monarchf and the
courtroom is the kingdom. It helps a party
if the jury thinks that the judge is
sympathetic to that party's cause but most
trial judges try hard not to show favoritism
in front of the jury.
(Emphasis added)
The Trial Practice Newsletter, David F. Binder, Esq.f p. 2,
Shepard's/McGraw-Hillf February 1987. Jurots tend to look upon
the judge with a great degree of faith.

They have no idea

whether the judge is making an erroneous ruling or is otherwise
acting improperly.

If the jury perceives that the judge favors

one side in a given case, it is devastating to the hapless
opponent.

This happened at the Onyeabor tr|al.
The trial judge commented directly on the believability

or quality of the plaintiff's expert testimony on at least 14
occasions during the 12-day trial (See Tabl£ I). For example,
Mr. Onyeabor attempted to prove the economic value of his future
lost earning capacity by establishing that he had developed
"worker skills" by virtue of his occupation in Nigeria that were
transferable to occupations in the United States.

To do this,

Mr. Onyeabor called as an expert witness Mr. Alan Heal, a
certified rehabilitation counselor with a master's degree in
vocational rehabilitation counseling.

15

Mr.ftealhad ten years

TABLE I

DIRECT COMMENTS ON EVIDENCE BY TRIAL COURT

| Very SeriousH
App. Day of
No. Trial/Date
8 - 2/11

Witness Name/
Called By

Transcript
Vol,/Page

Alan Heal (P)

J 175-180, Court expresses doubt that Mr. Onyeabor will ever go out and get a job as a
superintendent of a construction project; casts doubt on Heal's opinion as to
182
what Onyeabor would have made and interjects statements that emphasize that
Heal's opinion is not valid for the U.S. but only for Nigeria; casts doubt
upon Onyeabor's income potential.

Substance and Effect of Comment on Evidence

2.

8 - 2/12

Boyd Pjeldsted K 18-22
(P)

Judge casts doubt on validity of expert's testimony as to value of lost future
earnings by referring to it as "pure speculation"; reveals his opinion of Mr.
Onyeabor's earning potential by allowing only testimony of $5.00 per hour.

3.

7 - 2/10

Edward Spencer I 45-46
M.D. (D)

Interjects comments that emphasize negative aspects of witness's testimony
about Onyeabor.

4.

11 - 2/17

Linda Gummow,
Ph.D. (P)

M 29-30

Judge offered opinion that counsel had not asked a certain question; (he was
wrong - see T. 193-4 (2/12)).

5.

7 - 2/10

Linda Gummow,
Ph.D. (P)

H 29-31

Court indicates sua sponte opinion that expert is not qualified to render an
opinion as to whether Onyeabor was unconscious at scene because expert wasn't
present.

2/04

7.

11 - 2/17

Thomas
D 325, 333, Judge discredits documentary evidence by making disparaging comments about use
348, 382, of exhibit notebooks given to jurors at beginning of trial; severely scolds
Soderberg, M.D.
383, 443, counsel in front of jury.
Gerald Moress,
444
M. D.
Richard
Nielsen, M.D.
(P)
Linda Gummow,
Ph.D. (P)

M 49-53

On issue of using treatises to rebut prior witness's testimony, judge makes
numerous comments that cast discredit upon plaintiff's expert by expressing
dubiety on methods employed by the witness.

TABLE I CONTINUED
App. Day of
No. Trial/Date

Witness Name/ Transcript
Called By
Vol./Page

Substance and Effect of Comment on Evidence
Serious

8.

2 - 2/03

Dennis Leavitt, C 76-79
(P)

Judge expresses doubt that Onyeabor's car struck center median, causing him
to be jostled; casts plaintiff's theory of mechanism of injury into doubt;
and cross-examines witness.

9.

2 - 2/03

Dennis Leavitt, C 72
Officer (P)

Judge comments that the officer's experience did not justify him in expressing opinion that Onyeabor could have struck head; casts doubt on plaintiff's
theory of head trauma causing brain injury.

10. 3-4

2/042/05

Richard Goka
M.D. (P)

D 483E 495-6

Judge says he is "troubled" by a glossary of terms and states that most words
used by the doctor "don't mean a thing to us ... I am sure they don't to the
jury"; effectively casts doubt on testimony of expert medical witnesses.

11.

2/06

Linda Gummow
Ph.D. (P)

F 845

Judge interjects sua sponte and cuts off witness who is explaining future
risk of head injury to plaintiff; thereby implies little risk.
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rTmportarTtl
12.

3 - 2/04

Patrick Chukwu
(P)

D 295

Judge refers to Nigerian witness as one of "these young ones," demeaning this
witness and other younger Nigerians who had previously testified.

13.

8 - 2/11

Elizabeth
Onyeabor (P)

J 132-135

Casts doubt about ability of wife to have knowledge of and comment on why
plaintiff took certain classes more than once, and why he had certain grades.

14.

2 - 2/03

Dennis Andrews
(P)

C 142-144

Questions witness sua sponte about details of accident leaving impression
that witness was perhaps not thorough.
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experience in the fieldf and was well-qualified to assess
impaired earning capacity (T. J-150-154).
Mr. Heal determined Mr. Onyeaborfs pre-existing worker
traits by an examination of his work life prior to the accident
(T. J-153).

He valued those traits in part by the income Mr.

Onyeabor made in Nigeria, together with his job history and
worker traits (T. J-153-157).

(Mr. Onyeabor had produced a tax

certificate and evidence of the exchange rate; See Exs. 12 and
13.)

Mr. Heal considered both Nigerian and U.S. jobs when he

formed his opinion as to impaired earning capacity (T. J-175).
Mr. Heal was asked the value of the impaired earning
capacity, and the defense objected claiming that the value
depended on whether Mr. Onyeabor returned to Nigeria (T. J-176).
The court then interjected several prejudicial comments in the
presence of the jury about the quality and believability of this
testimony (See Appendix 1 ) :
(The Court) If he [sic] assuming that he
can step out into the job as superintendent
in a construction job, that's in the United
States, at that point in time we don't know.
... Well, I think I will let him testify to
that in case the jury thinks Mr. Onyeabor
could go out and get a job of a
superintendent of a construction based upon
the evidence that they have heard. Then they
can use that figure. If they don't [i.e.,
believe the evidence] they don't need to.
(Emphasis added)
(T. J-176:23, 177:17; App. 1). After considerable argumentation
in front of the jury as to the appropriateness of the
occupational expert's assumptions (T. J-178-179), Mr. Heal
stated that he had directly observed the activities of "job
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superintendent."

Based on this observation in combination with

Mr. Onyeaborfs job history, Mr. Heal believed Mr. Onyeabor could
be a job superintendent.

Mr. Onyeaborfs counsel asked about the

income of a person with the skill description of job
superintendent (T. J-179:21).

Mr. Heal's answer was based upon

his opinion of Mr. Onyeabor's capacity to perform this type of
work (T. J-180:l-9).
doubt:

The court then observed, with a note of

"Well, that may be his opinion, yes* (T. J-180:10).

The

court indicated further doubt about the quality of the testimony
when it said a few lines later:
Well, that's where these United Spates jobs,
it seems to me, are relevant and important in
his opinion. (Emphasis added)
(T. J-180:16; App. 1). This sounds like defense closing
argument, i.e., Mr. Heal's testimony was suspect because his
evaluation of impaired earning capacity was based in part upon
what Mr. Onyeabor did in Nigeria (see also Jf-182:8), and what he
did in Nigeria is not trustworthy.

The evaluation of Mr. Heal's

testimony should have been left to the jury.

The court should

not have intervened on the side of the defendant.
The next day, the court seriously compounded this error
with another comment on the evidence.

Mr. Onyeabor called Boyd

Fjeldsted, a Senior Research Economist at the University of Utah,
to place an economic value upon Mr. Onyeabor's loss (App. 2).
Mr. Fjeldsted was asked about a number of possible scenarios for
a starting wage, given Mr. Onyeabor's history.

At that point,

the judge jumped in with these extremely prejudicial comments,
apparently designed to emphasize the defense viewpoint that any
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consideration of the work skills gained by Mr. Onyeabor in
Nigeria was somehow irrelevant:
MR. SYKES: ... I am trying to make a
differential calculation that would take some
of this into account, presumably. That's
what I am trying to do.
THE COURT: Well, what did he do Mr.
Fjeldsted? Did he give any consideration to
his earning rate — his earning rate in this
country?
MR. SYKES: I think by the ~
THE COURT: Just answer the question.
Did he give any consideration to that earning
rate since he has been in this country in
making any calculation? (Emphasis added)
(T. K-18-19; App. 2 ) . After some discussion about the basis of
the calculation, the court further commented:
Seems to me it is pure speculation in the
first year he is going to make $6.00 an hour,
and the next year $10.00 an hour, and the
next year $15.00 an hour. I think that is
pure speculation. ... Well what hourly
rates are you using? Did you have him use in
this?
MR. SYKES: I can either show them to
you or I can tell you right now.
THE COURT: Well, show them to me. The
trouble with this, as far as I am concerned,
is that it assumes facts that are clearly not
in evidence, and we have no basis for
believing that this progress will be one that
should be considered rather than a thousand
others, you see. (Emphasis added)
(T. K-20:4, 21:17).
The judge finally allowed in only testimony to the
effect that Mr. Onyeabor could make $5.00 per hour for the rest
of his life (T. B-22:8), despite significant expert testimony by
Mr. Heal to the contrary (T. J-153-157).

A reasonable jury would

conclude that the court personally believed that Mr. Onyeaborfs
evidence on earning capacity of $40,000 per year was greatly
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exaggerated because the court had indicated that the only
believable evidence on Mr. Onyeaborfs capacity was $5.00 per hour,
That should have been solely the juryfs decision.
The judge was very one-sided in his interjections and
comments, which tended to emphasize negative aspects about Mr.
Onyeabor.

For example, during the cross-examination of Dr.

Edward Spencer, a well-knownf defense-oriented orthopedic surgeon
(App. 3), Mr. Onyeabor's counsel quoted a section of Dr.
Spencer's report with the intention to question him on how it
related to a previous medical examination.

(T. 1-45:20).

The

court interrupted sua sponte and interjected a gratuitous comment
which highlighted those aspects of the passage "negative" to the
plaintiff.

This interjection provided Dr. Spencer, a hostile

witness, an opportunity to inject additional negative comments
about the plaintiff:
Q (Mr. Sykes): In the report that you
wrote, didn't you say ... [varioup things
quoted]?
A (Dr. Spencer): That's rigjit.
THE COURT: So aside from th^ hysterical
feature that you think you noted, the
inconsistency in sitting posture, and the
sensory examination in performance of the
straight-leg examination, everything was the
same?
THE WITNESS: Well, no. He Was
describing some weird features of loss of
memory and general weakness and various
tingling sensations, which hadn't been there
before. And also neck pain, which also
hadn't been there before. (Emphasis added)
(T. 1-45-46; App. 3).
On another occasion, Mr. Onyeabor challenged Dr. Robert
Cook, a defense psychologist who practices in Denver, on the
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issue of proper test conditions at an I.M.E.

Dr. Cook had

administered sensitive psychological tests to Mr. Onyeabor at the
law offices of William Stegall, the defense attorney, to whom Mr.
Onyeabor was hostile.

Mr. Onyeabor desired to impeach Dr. Cook's

procedure and set the stage for this by asking Dr. Cook:
Q (Mr. Sykes): All right. The
conference room, however, is right next to
the reception area [?]. It is enclosed by
glass, and you can watch people walk by,
can't you?
A (Dr. Cook): Yes.
Q: And you can hear the phone ring,
can't you?
A: Yes.
(Emphasis added)
(T. K-194).

Mr. Onyeabor's counsel later questioned Dr. Linda

Gummow, a neuropsychologist, in rebuttal about how this hostile
test environment could impact the test results.

Counsel asked if

it was proper to administer psychological tests in a conference
room "that had a glass wall and then it (sic) was a few feet away
from the reception area."

(Emphasis added) (T. M-29:13).

In

response to an objection, the court again sided with the defense
and made this comment on the evidence:

"I don't think he [Dr.

Cook] said that and don't you put your view as to the distance."
(Emphasis added) (App. 4). This was an assessment of the
evidence —

and an erroneous one at that —

had testified.

as to how Dr. Cook

The memory of the testimony and its evaluation

was the province of the jury.
One of the most serious comments on the evidence
concerned the exhibit notebooks, which were provided for the
jurors.

Judge Dee had ordered that Onyeaborfs counsel could
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prepare looseleaf notebooks containing the documentary evidence
on which there would be no objection.

The attorneys had agreed

in advance of trial as to which exhibits wovild be placed in the
notebooks.

Plaintiff attempted to make frequent use of the

exhibit notebooks from the outset, asking tl^e jury to refer to
certain documents that counsel deemed significant for his client.
On five occasions during the first three days of trialf the court
made disparaging or negative comments about the use of the
notebooks (App. 6). Finally, the following exchange occurred
which was not only tremendously embarrassing to Mr. Onyeabor's
counsel, but very damaging to his strategy of having the jury
evaluate certain documents:
MR. SYKES: May we have the jjury turn to
that, Your Honor, to 55?
JUDGE CROFT: Why don't you &sk him the
question and I think the jury can get it
easier from what the doctor says ihan they
can trying to read what the book £ays. And
all of you follow what the doctor is saying
at the same time.
MR. SYKES: Your Honor, the <t>nly reason
I do that, I think it would be helpful to see
and hear at the same time.
JUDGE CROFT: Okay. Let's have an
understanding that any time the j^iry wants to
pick up the book to look at the exhibit that
the witness is talking about you ftre free to
do so, if you don't want to you d^n't have
to.
MR. SYKES: Okay. I think it would be
helpful in this case, Your Honor.
JUDGE CROFT: I'm going to let them make
the decision because they may not find it
that way. (Emphasis added)
(T. D-443-444; App. 6). These interjection^ by the court on the
use of the exhibit notebooks amounted to a Comment that the
documentary evidence in the case was not as important as the oral
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evidence.

It also amounted to a negative comment on counsel's

methods in presenting the case.

Both comments were very

prejudicial.
There simply is not room to fully discuss every one
of the court's direct comments on the weight of the evidence, so
they are cataloged in Table I above.

To summarize, the court

commented that Dr. Linda Gummow was not qualified to render an
opinion as to whether or not Mr. Onyeabor lost consciousness at
the scene of the accident because she was not present (App. 5);
that Dr. Gummow was subject to some discredit because she used
learned treatises to rebut a prior witness's testimony (App. 7);
that the judge doubted whether Mr. Onyeabor's vehicle struck the
center median at the time of the accident, causing him to be
jostled and to strike his head (App. 8); that an investigating
officer's experience did not justify his opinion as to whether
Mr. Onyeabor probably struck his head (App. 9); that certain
medical terms were too complex for even a medical doctor's
understanding, so the jury would not comprehend them either (App.
10); as well as other important matters (Apps. 11-14).

These

comments on the evidence severely prejudiced Mr. Onyeabor.
" Prejudicial Interjections And Interruptions The judge frequently commented on the evidence in the
form of sua sponte interjections and interruptions (see Table II).
Some of these were substantively quite serious, while others
amounted to witness intimidation.

They had the general effect

of casting doubt upon some aspect of Mr. Onyeabor's case.
One example occurred while counsel was questioning Dr.
Richard Nielsen, a prominent otolaryngologist, about Mr.

TABLE II

INTERJECTIONS AND INTERRUPTIONS (SUA SPONTE)* BY TRIAL COURT

| Very Serious Interruptions tl
App. Day of
No. Trial/Date

Witness Name/
Called By

Transcript
Vol./Page

Substance and Effect of Interjection or Interruption

15.

3 - 2/04

Richard Nielsen
M.D. (P)

D 460

Judge invites opposition to object to expert's qualifications; casts doubt
upon expert's qualifications.

16.

6 - 2/09

Mark Zelig,
Ph.D. (P)

G 95-96

Judge interjects comment to help defense; scolds plaintiff's expert witness;
one of few instances in trial where judge interjected during defense examination .

17.

8 - 2/11

Alan Heal (P)

J 187

Judge interjects to help defense; questions plaintiff's expert on basis of
opinion.

18.

6 - 2/09

Mark Zelig,
Ph.D. (P)

G 66-67

Judge interjects and tells jury that the doctor is "broadening his answer
... too much."

19.

9 - 2/12

Boyd Fjeldsted
(P)

K 9

Rude interjection which implies that plaintiff's counsel has suggested an
answer.

20.

8 - 2/11

Alan Heal (P)

J 196

Rude and unnecessary interjection which suggests that plaintiff's expert
has not answered a question posed by defense counsel.

21.

8

2/11

David Nilsson
Ph.D. (P)

J 63

Rude interruption during plaintiff's examination of expert suggesting that
expert has exceeded his expertise.

22.

2/04

Gerald Moress,
M.D. (P)

D 422

Interjects to question expert witness about where plaintiff hit his head.

23.

9 - 2/12

Robert Cook,
Ph.D. (D)

K 209

Court interjects to help defense witness on re-cross as to what was said
earlier.
1 Serious Interruptions 1

24.

4 - 2/05

Richard Goka,
M.D. (P)

E 497

Questions plaintiff's expert as to whether he understands certain head
injury terms from a glossary.

* Raised by the court without defense counsel objections.

t Other serious interjections are cataloged in Table I,
Tab Nos. 3, 5, 6, and 11.

TABLE II CONTINUED
App. Day of
No. Trial/Date

Witness Name/
Called By

Transcript
Vol./Page

Substance and Effect of Interjection or Interruption

J 38

Questions plaintiff's expert about something that "troubled me" regarding
scope of jury's decision to decide the case.

25.

8 - 2/11

David Nilsson,
Ph.D. (P)

26.

5 - 2/06

Duncan Wallace, F 744-5
M.D. (P)

27.

8 - 2/11

David Nilsson,
Ph.D. (P)

J 9

Interjects in attempt to narrow scope of answer by plaintiff's expert.

28.

6 - 2/09

Mark Zelig,
Ph.D. (P)

G 9

Interrupts to help defense counsel's examination on issue of grades.

Emmanuel
Onyeabor (P)

M 6

Interrupts plaintiff's answer to important question.

Richard Goka,
M.D. (P)

D 4

Interjects to try to narrow scope of witness's expertise.
1 Unnecessary and Disruptive Interjections [
Price of left-front tire repair offered to show that plaintiff did in fact
hit the median strip and was severely jostled; witness hassled by judge.

29. 11 - 2/17
30.

3 - 2/04

Judge interjects to unnecessarily restrict plaintiff's re-direct examinanation on expert witness's own drop in IQ after expert's gas poisoning head
injury; defense counsel had earlier raised the issue of expert's own injury
on cross-examination to impeach expert's objectivity.

31.

7 - 2/10

Emmanuel
Onyeabor (P)

I 103

32.

3 - 2/04

Stevens
Pedersen (P)

D 311-12

Didn't want plaintiff's father-in-law to testify about the fact that he was
hard of hearing; offered to lay foundation that plaintiff's wife would
notice hearing problems in plaintiff caused by the accident.

33.

3 - 2/04

Richard Goka,
M.D. (P)

D 476-7

Interrupted to get evidence admitted before plaintiff's counsel had
finished laying foundation.

34.

3 - 2/04

Richard Nielson D 456
M.D. (P)

Unnecessary scolding of counsel on evidentary matter.

35.

Many/
Various

Patrick Chukwu Many
Mr. Onyeabor
Pamela Walker, MA
Stevens Pedersen
Richard Goka, M.D.
Linda Gummow, Ph.D.
Mark Zelig, Ph.D. (P)

Many rude, unnecessary, annoying interruptions and interjections that
amounted to witness intimidation.
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Onyeabor's neurosensory hearing loss.

Dr. Nielsen was asked as

to the percentage of permanent partial impairment resulting from
that aspect of the injuries.

He responded that there was a one

to two percent impairment, at which point Jildge Croft interjected
sua sponte with the following:
Q (Mr. Sykes): One or two percent
[referring to permanent hearing impairment]?
A (Dr. Nielsen): Yes, that's -- I feel
that's rather an artificial way to measure
hearing loss, but that's the way it's
commonly used in disability.
JUDGE CROFT: I assume, Mr. Stegall, you
are not objecting to lack of qualification
testimony?
MR. STEGALL: Your Honor, I understand
the gentleman is an ENT specialist and —
JUDGE CROFT: You stipulate l^e is an
expert in that field?
MR. STEGALL: In the field.
JUDGE CROFT: And can testify without
further foundation?
(Emphasis added)
(T. D-460:9-17; App. 15). A juror could not} fail to miss the
fact that the judge was attacking the credibility of Dr.
Nielsen's testimony by questioning his qualifications as an
expert.
The court frequently interjected Comments during the
questioning of plaintiff's experts which inferred that the expert
did not answer the question fully (Apps. 16, 17, 18, 20, and 21).
The effect of these comments certainly gave the jury the
impression that the expert was being less tHan candid.

Another

impact of the sua sponte interruptions (Appq. 15-23) was to
suggest that Mr. Onyeabor's experts either did not answer
questions substantively, or had said too much and needed to be
interrupted.

Every such instance related tq something of
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substance about the case, such as whether Mr. Onyeabor struck his
head (App. 22); to what extent it is appropriate to rely on
experts from different fields (App. 20); or how a discount rate
is derived (App. 19).
There were additionally seven other serious
interruptions (Apps. 24-30).

For example, the court questioned

whether or not Dr. Goka understood certain medical terms (App.
24); the court indicated that it was "troubled" by something that
it thought Dr. Nielsen said (App. 25); and the court emphasized
particular negative points brought up in the testimony (App. 9).
The net impact of this series of interjections was to impute
weakness to certain evidence presented by Mr. Onyeabor (see Table
II for a summary).
Lastly, the court simply interrupted witnesses time and
time again, making it difficult to examine and cross-examine
them, and in effect harassing them (App. 31-35).

These actions

by the judge were unnecessary and intimidating to the witnesses.
The court in Egede-Nissen, supra, noted that judicial
interruptions can suggest lack of judicial confidence in the
integrity of witnesses:
The court, of course, may question witnesses. ,
However, the court's questions may not be
phrased in a manner indicative of the court's
attitude toward the merits of the cause, thus
constituting an impermissible comment on the
evidence.
Id. at 1222.

These repeated interjections by the court

certainly must have indicated to the jurors the court's feelings
on the merits.
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The Court generally interfered with counsel's
cross-examination, which severely disrupted Mr. Onyeabor's
presentation of the case.

In addition to tfye examples discussed

above, the following are relevant:
The court refused to allow counsel to write down on the
board ^hat a defease witness had ignored in forcing his opinion
(T. K-54-5); interfered with the cross-examination of a defense
psychologist by the use of a chart (T. K-ll$-117); refused to
allow counsel to write down on the board a score used in a test
that Mr. Onyeabor had taken with that psychologist (T. K-167-8);
interrupted counsel in the middle of a question and before the
answer (T. L-46); interjected harshly in th^ examination of Mr.
Onyeabor's psychologist with respect to an exhibit the court
thought had not been admitted (T. N-12) which should have been
admitted (T. K-153); and interfered with the drawing of a diagram
during the psychologist's rebuttal testimony (T. N-14).
A court has wide discretion in controlling the conduct
of a trial.

However, unnecessarily harsh treatment of counsel

constitutes a comment on the evidence.

Messier v. Simmons Gun

Specialists, Inc., 687 P.2d 121 (Okla. 1984).

The Court noted:

However, as long as counsel is not unduly
restricted, his knowledge challenged, or his
motives impugned, the court may direct
counsel to refrain from delay and may comment
on a waste of time.
Id. at 129.

Thus, even if some of the interjections made by the

court could be deemed to be made in the interests of conserving
time, the manner in which they were done certainly impugned the
motives and knowledge of Onyeabor's counsel in such a way as to
reflect prejudicially upon his case.

" Arguments In Front Of The Jury The court permitted extensive arguments as to evidence
in front of the jury.

This amounted to a comment on the evidence

because it indicated that the court believed plaintiff's evidence
to be weak or unconvincing.
Normally, such argumentation and disputes about
evidence would have occurred outside the presence of the jury, at
least in a side bar conference.

However, the court refused all

three of Mr. Onyeabor's requests to approach the bench (T. B-46,
C-76, 1-103).

This effectively intimidated counsel from making

further requests to approach the bench.

The only time that the

court allowed counsel to approach the bench was when defense
counsel, Mr. Stegall, asked permission (T. L-190).
As a result of the refusal of the court to allow
counsel to approach the bench, counsel conducted frequent
and lengthy interchanges with the court on the admissibility of
evidence in front of the jury.

Defense counsel frequently

interjected prejudicial information.

This constituted a comment

on the evidence because the court allowed it to happen.

For

example, the judge frequently allowed argument over the proper
use of learned treatises (T. E-560-564; F-842; H-20-23; M-32-36;
and M-49-54).

The court allowed argumentation on the

admissibility of certain exhibits, including Exhibit 112, a film
regarding head injury in general (T. E-498-499); Exhibit 11, a
photo album (T. G-137); and the admissibility of evidence on
medical bills (T. J-140-142).
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The court allowed argumentation about other important
evidentiary points such as the viability of Dr. Gummow's
disability evaluation (T. F-856-857); whether or not Liz Onyeabor
would be allowed to testify on the issue of Mr. Onyeabor!s grades
and why he took certain classes twice (T. J-132-135); whether Liz
Onyeabor would be allowed to testify as to what Mr. Onyeaborfs
employment and school plans were for the future if there had been
no accident (T. J-143); and what rate the economist Boyd
Fjeldsted should be allowed to use in figuring Mr. Onyeaborfs
loss of future earning capacity (T. K-18-22)|.
This argumentation was harmful to Mr. Onyeabor•s case
because the judge invariably ended the dispute by ruling against
Mr. Onyeaborfs position.
open.

However, there were no other options

Counsel could not approach the bench, and the only other

avenue was to let the erroneous rulings slide by without any
attempt to correct them.

The overall impact of the court's

refusal to allow counsel to approach the bench and permitting
extensive argumentation in front of the jury was to prejudice Mr.
Onyeabor's case because of comments on the evidence.
- The Demeanor Of The Court Prejudiced The Jury The trial judge exhibited harshness and a hostile
demeanor toward the plaintiff's case and counsel throughout the
trial.

This prejudicial demeanor was very significant, but does

not display well in the printed record because it included facial
expressions, tone of voice, sighs and body language. Therefore,
counsel has procured affidavits from some oi: the doctors and
other witnesses who were present at the trial and who witnessed
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these events.

Such allegations are properly shown by affidavit.

Egede-Nissen, supra at 1222.

These affidavits are contained in

Appendices 36-39.
The court was particularly harsh with plaintiff's
counsel during the first three days of trial, frowning
frequently, sighing and demonstrating by "body language" that the
court did not think much of Mr. Onyeabor's case or his counsel
(Apps. 36, 37, 38, and 39). For example, Dr. Brian Burns, a
chiropractor who has testified over 30 times, stated that he had
never seen "even one judge be so discourteous ... or hostile
towards the plaintiff's counsel."

(App. 37). Dr. Linda Gummow,

a neuropsychologist who treated Mr. Onyeabor, stated in her
affidavit that not only did the judge's tone of voice, facial
expressions, frowning, and general attitude demonstrate a
definite bias against the plaintiff, but that his comments
demonstrated a definite hostility toward her personally (App. 36).
Robert Jinks, an experienced trial attorney in California and
Hawaii, noted "facial expressions of disgust and dissatisfaction,
including grunts and sighs that were related to plaintiff's
evidence of expert witnesses and exhibits" (App. 38). Mr. Jinks
noted that he had never seen a case "where the judge was so
obviously and blatantly biased against one party" (App. 38, ?3).
Kay Nebeker made similar, articulate comments about the court's
obvious bias (App. 39).
When overruling Mr. Onyeabor's objections, the court
used a very harsh and gruff voice.

He appeared to lack patience

with everything requested by plaintiff's counsel.
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A good example

of this, which does appear in the record in partr can be seen in
the incident having to do with the exhibit notebooks provided to
the jurors (see discussion above; see also App. 6; T. D-443-444).
When Mr. Onyeabor's counsel tried to use the notebooks, the court
gave noticeable shrugs of the shoulders and "snapped" at counsel,
making comments about what he obviously regarded as a laborious
process (T. D-325, 333, 348, and 382).
Mr. Onyeabor's counsel did object to the judge's
comments on the evidence in front of the jury after the third day
of trial, although it will not appear directly in the record.

At

the end of the third day of trial, counsel met with the court
in chambers, and "had it out" on the issues described above.

The

reporter had gone home, so it won't be found on the record;
however, there are indications in the record, as well as an
admission by the court, that the incident did occur.

See the

reference to this issue in plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for a New Trial (R. 694-695), and th6 court's
acknowledgment of the incident in the course of its ruling on the
Motion for a New Trial (T. P-87:18).
The meeting between counsel and the court referred to
in the record lasted approximately 30 to 40 minutes, was quite
animated and covered the comments on the evidence extensively.
The conference occurred on the evening of the third day of trial,
February 4, 1987. The next day, Thursday, February 5, 1987, was
better.

The court indicated that the jurors could now look at

the notebooks if requested by counsel (App. 6, last page; T.
E-491).

However, the comments on the evidence and interjections
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into the record continued relatively unabated, even increasing
the second week of trial.
Obviously, Mr. Onyeabor's counsel was reluctant to
object every time the court commented on the evidence.

It would

have resulted in a spate of continuous objections, as can be seen
from Tables I and II.

The Egede-Nissen court said:

While the report of proceedings does not
reflect contemporaneous objections to such
conduct [i.e., the judge's "body language"
indicating disbelief during the testimony],
concurrent objection is not required.
Understandably, counsel may be reluctant to
note such an objection, particularly in the
presence of the jury, and may elect not to
object at all if the incidents were only
occasional and minor. If, however, the
occurrences were ... frequent and marked ...
counsel should object to the court's conduct.
(Emphasis added)
Id. at 1223.

It would simply have been futile to have continued

objecting.
- Cumulative Effect Of Comments The comments on the evidence and interjections into the
record in this case were many, varied and pervasive.

Although

some of the errors and comments were very serious, many would not
have been grounds for reversal standing alone.

Viewed from a

cumulative perspective, however, these errors were devastating.
The Egede-Nissen court said:
A trial judge should not enter into the "fray
of combat" nor assume the role of counsel.
An isolated instance of such conduct may be
deemed harmless error, however, if it cannot
be said to violate constitutional bounds of
judicial comment. ... On the other hand, the
cumulative effect of repeated interjections
by the court may constitute reversible error.
In the instant case, we believe the trial
court, perhaps inadvertently without meaning
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to do so, actively interceded in tthe trial
more frequently and at greater length than
the circumstances warranted ... . (Emphasis
added)
Id. at 1223.

The judge in Onyeabor actively interceded far more

than he needed tof even if some of the instances may have been
justified.
The effect on the jury of the judge's actions should
not be underestimated.

One court characterized it in this

manner:
Every lawyer who has ever tried a case, and
every judge who has ever presided at a trial,
knows that the jurors are inclined to regard
the lawyers engaged in the trial as
partisans, and are quick to attend an
interruption by the judge, to which they may
attach an importance and a meaning in no way
intended. It is the working of human nature
of which all men who have had any experience
in the trial of cases may take notice.
Between the contrary winds of advocacy, a
juror would not be a man if he did not, in
some of the distractions of mind which attend
a hard-fought and doubtful case, grasp the
words and manner of the judge as a guide to
lead him out of his perplexity. On the other
hand, a presiding judge has no way to measure
the effect of his interruption. The very
fact that he takes a witness away from the
attorney for examination may, in the tense
atmosphere of a trial, lead to great
prejudice. (Emphasis added)
State v. Jackson, 145 P. 470 (Wash. 1915), quoted with approval
in Risley v. Moberq, 419 P.2d 151 (Wash. 1966).

In the

hard-fought case pressed by Mr. Onyeabor in the lower court, the
cumulative effect of the comments on the evidence and judicial
interjections was devastating to Mr. Onyeaborfs chances of
receiving a fair trial.

He did not receive a fair trial.
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POINT II.
Dr. Clark - A Surprise Witness
ALLOWING DR. LINCOLN CLARK, A DEFENSE PSYCHIATRIST, TO
TESTIFY AT TRIAL WAS PREJUDICIAL SURPRISE BECAUSE HE
WAS NOT NOTICED AS A WITNESS UNTIL SIX BUSINESS DAYS
BEFORE TRIAL, THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT FURNISHED A COPY
OF HIS REPORT UNTIL THE THIRD DAY OF TRIAL AND THE
REPORT WAS INCOMPLETE.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW
Rule 26(e)(1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as
follows:
A party is under a duty seasonably to
supplement his response with respect to any
question directly addressed to ... the
identity of each person expected to be called
as an expert witness at trial, the subject
matter on which he is expected to testify,
and the substance of his testimony.
(Emphasis added)
Rule 51(a)(3) provides that a new trial may be granted on the
basis of "accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against."
A defendant's calling of a medical doctor to testify
about the cause of a plaintiff's injury does not constitute
surprise where the plaintiff has notice of the specific witness
and subject matter of the testimony.

Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d

695 (Utah 1977) (where an earlier answer to an interrogatory by
defendant had stated the substance of a specific doctor's
testimony about a certain disease).
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However, the court should

exclude a defense medical expert where the name and/or subject
matter of the testimony is not disclosed in a timely manner.
Acosta v. Superior Court, 706 P.2d 763 (Ariz. App. 1985); Hadid
v. Alexander, 462 A.2d 1216 (Md. App. 1983); Lodrique v.
Houma-Terrebonne Airport Com'n, 450 So.2d 1004 (La. App. 1984);
and Sturdivant v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 476 A.2d 1074 (Conn. App.
1984).

Exclusion of the witness is further justified where no

report or a late report is prepared, or where the report does not
disclose important information.
hindered.

Otherwise, cross-examination is

Hoover v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 611 F.2d 1132 (5th

Cir. 1980); Sirianni v. General Motors Corp., 325 F.Supp. 509
(W.D. Pa. 1971);

DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 433

F.Supp. 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
The trial court abuses its discretion if it denies a
Rule 59(a)(3) motion for a new trial where there is a surprise
"which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against."
Jensen, supra; see also Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P.2d 339, 341
(Utah 1979).

The surprise contemplated by Rule 59(a) must result

from some adverse circumstance or situation in which a party is
placed unexpectedly to his injury, and without any fault or
negligence of his own.

Havas v. Haupt, 583 P.2d 1094, 1095 (Nev.

1978).

ARGUMENT
I •

, .

„

I

- Introduction The facts regarding Dr. Clark's reappearance in this
case are egregious.

As of December 5, 1986, Dr. Clark was
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unequivocally out of the case, claiming Mr. Onyeabor was
frightening to him, and stating "I have already expressed I want
out of this.

I mean I made that very clear at the beginning."

(Emphasis added) (T. S-18).

He stated, "I'm not going to change

my mind" (Emphasis added) (T. S-19).

Dr. Clark's withdrawal from

the case was the reason for continuing the trial from December 8,
1986, to February 2, 1987.

No amount of "ordinary prudence"

could have warned Mr. Onyeabor's counsel that Dr. Clark would
reappear under these circumstances.
The defendants had a continuing duty to supplement
their responses to interrogatories wherein the names of all
witnesses were requested.
Procedure.

Rule 26(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil

Plaintiff asked for the names of all witnesses in the

interrogatories answered on July 21, 1986 (App. 44). The notice
of Dr. Clark as a witness, after his "final" withdrawal on
December 5, 1986, came by way of the defense supplementary
witness list served by mail on January 21, 1987 (R. 308). On
January 30, 1987, Plaintiff made a timely Motion in Limine to
prohibit Dr. Clark from testifying, which was denied by the court
(R. 326; T. Q-54).
- Prejudice To Mr. Onyeabor The court committed reversible error in not excluding
Dr. Clark's testimony.

His disclosure as a witness was not made

known to Mr. Onyeabor until six business days prior to trial, and
there was simply not time enough, given the exigency of
preparation for a major trial and the unavailability of defense
counsel, to take Dr. Clark's deposition (see Statement of Facts
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above).

It should be noted that counsel operated throughout this

entire case under an agreement of open discovery, i.e.,
depositions of all experts on both sides.

There were 10 to 15

depositions of expert witnesses conducted by the parties. Had
there been time and meaningful opportunity, Mr. Onyeabor would
have taken Dr. Clark's deposition.
Almost all courts refuse to allow last minute experts
to testify, under circumstances similar to those in Onyeabor.

In

Lodrigue v. Houma-Terrebonne Airport Com'n, supra, the defendants
in a personal injury suit had submitted an interrogatory to the
plaintiff asking for the names of any expert witnesses that
plaintiff intended to call.

A trial was scheduled for September

16, 1982, and the plaintiff supplemented his responses on
September 7, 1982, nine days before trial, submitting the name of
an expert witness and then was uncooperative to defendant's
request to depose the witness prior to trial.

The appellate

court in Lodrigue noted Louisiana's equivalent to Utah Rule
26(e)(1) which required a party to "seasonably" supplement
responses to interrogatories.

The trial court refused to allow

the witness to testify and was upheld on appeal because the
defendants were prejudiced in their discovery efforts.

Jd. at

1007.
The policy reasons for forbidding a last minute expert
to testify where the untimeliness of notice is unexplained are
well set out in the case of Acosta v. Superior Court, supra,
which has amazing parallels to Onyeabor.

In Acosta, the

plaintiff was a petitioner in a wrongful death malpractice action
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scheduled for trial on September 4, 1985.

The real party in

interest was an anesthesiologist.

The defense list of witnesses

did not include a certain doctor.

Two days after the deadline

for filing notice of witnesses, and 18 days prior to the trial
date, defense counsel apparently received a letter from a doctor
containing his opinion as to the cause of death.

The defense

counsel notified the plaintiff's counsel that the doctor would be
a witness but did not furnish a report until 13 days later, or
five days before trial.

The witness in question was unavailable

for deposition until trial.

The trial judge indicated his

intention to allow the witness to testify, and the plaintiff
brought a special action appealing the trial court's refusal to
strike the expert witness.

The appellate court held that the

trial court had abused its discretion, and vacated the order
allowing testimony by the witness.

The appellate court stated

that preclusion of a witness:
... should only be invoked where there is
both absence of good cause for the
untimeliness and prejudice to the opposing
party. Both conditions are met on the facts
of this case. Counsel for the [defendants]
has suggested no reason for the late
revelation of the witness save failure of his
clients to discover him until the eve of
trial. This is not good cause; dilatoriness
never is. Beyond this, no reason was
advanced for withholding the content of the
witness1 testimony for an additional two
weeks. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 764.

The Court noted the prejudice that would result to

the plaintiff, who had obtained a special visa to come to testify
from Mexico.

The Court observed that if the trial date were
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changed to permit additional discovery, that effort on the part
of the plaintiff would be lost.

There was additional prejudice:

[A] fixed trial date is a valuable asset.
Once lost, substantial delay of up to a year
could result. Finally, there is prejudice to
the administration of justice where trials
are delayed; courts cannot effectively
function if their calendars are subject to
the control of dilatory parties.
Id. at 765.
In the Onyeabor case, a fourth continuance of the trial
was not possible due to the precarious condition of Mr.
Onyeabor's mental health.

At the November 10, 1986, hearing on

the third defense Motion for Continuance (of the November 17th
trial date), Linda Gummow, Mr. Onyeabor's treating psychologist,
testified in opposition to a continuance.

She had previously

filed a report detailing the harm that Mr. Onyeabor had suffered
as a result of the previous continuance (R. 200). She indicated
that Mr. Onyeabor's psychological condition had deteriorated
considerably because of previous continuances (T. R-10-11).

Dr.

Duncan Wallace, Mr. Onyeabor's psychiatrist, also told a
frightening story of Mr. Onyeabor's serious loss of emotional
control resulting from the November continuance (T. E-699-702).
Mr. Onyeabor was simply "on the edge" mentally and emotionally,
and a number of people thought he would be a danger to himself
and others (R. 201) if yet a fourth continuance were to be
granted (T. S-2-3).
- No Explanation of Untimeliness The defendants never presented any reasonable
explanation as to the untimeliness of their notification of Dr.
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Clark's reappearance or their failure to present a timely written
report to the plaintiff as required by Rule 35, U.R.C.P., until
the third day of trial.

At the hearing on the Motion in Limine,

Mr. Stegall merely indicated the following:
In the first part of January Dr. Clark
contacted me and indicated that he was
concerned about being out of the case. ...
For that reason I have shown him as a
witness. (Emphasis added)
(T. Q-38-39).

If Mr. Stegall was aware of Dr. Clark's

reappearance in the "first part of January", why wasn't counsel
notified until January 21st?

Furthermore, why did he wait until

February 4th, the third day of trial, to provide a written report
(App. 41) as required by Rules 35 and 26(e)(1), U.R.C.P.?

There

has been no explanation of either delay.
The failure to provide notice of Dr. Clark is puzzling.
First of all, Dr. Clark's own testimony was suspicious.

He was

asked directly and pointedly when he decided to re-enter the case
and he simply evaded the question, finally giving a vague answer:
Q (Mr. Sykes): When did you do that
[offer to re-enter the case]?
A (Dr. Clark): I have forgotten the
exact date when that occurred?
Q. Early in January, late in December?
A. I think that Mr. Stegall would have
to answer that.
Q. I am asking you.
A. I do not have a record of that, when
it was exactly.
Q. Well do you — it has only been two
months. Do you recall approximately, was it
before or after Christmas?
A. Well, I think it was after Christmas,
but I am not certain of that. (Emphasis
added)
(T. L-127-128).
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There was plenty of opportunity to provide notice of
Dr. Clark's re-entry as an expert witness.

Both counsel were in

frequent telephone contact during December, 1986, and January of
1987.

There are at least three separate pieces of written

correspondence from Mr. Stegall to Mr. Sykes during that period
(App. 40); yet, on none of these occasions was counsel made aware
that Dr. Clark had re-entered the case, allegedly in "early
January."

All of the correspondence, as well as oral

conversations with counsel up until that time, indicated that Dr.
Cook of Denver was the only contemplated defense expert witness
(App. 40), and trial preparation was done accordingly.
- Failure To Provide A Timely, Complete Report In Sirianni v. General Motors Corp., supra, the trial
judge excluded the testimony of a physician where the plaintiff
presented no pre-trial report to the defense.

The court regarded

the testimony of the doctor as that of a "new medical witness"
even though the doctor had treated the plaintiff three years
prior to the trial.

The Court held:

The exclusion of such testimony without a
prior report is a well-standing practice in
this court under our pre-trial rules in
support of a strong policy against the
introduction of surprise testimony of expert
opinion witnesses.
Id. at 511
The failure to produce a report from Dr. Clark until
the third day of trial was highly prejudicial.

The report was

seven single-spaced pages (App. 41), and was handed to Mr.

39

Onyeabor's counsel on the morning of February 4thf the third day
of trial.

Later that same day, Mr. Onyeabor began calling his

expert witnesses on the head injury issue (Drs. Moress, Nielsen
and Goka —

see Vol. D of transcript), and had called virtually

all of these witnesses by the close of trial on Friday, February
6th.

Thus, none of plaintiff's witnesses really had an

opportunity to read and assess Dr. Clark's report prior to the
time they testified.

Counsel did not have time to analyze the

report and discuss it with his experts, because of the hectic
nature of daily trial preparation in a major case.
Dr. Clark's late report presented an additional
significant problem.

It did not state a conclusion as to what

was wrong with Mr. Onyeabor (App. 41:7).

It indicated that his

native abilities were more limited than those of his siblings,
but that he was "... a man of average general ability" who simply
needed to redirect his career goals (App. 41:7).

There was

simply no adverse diagnosis or clue as to what his opinion really
was on several important issues having to do with brain injury.
However, on cross-examination it turned out that Dr. Clark did
not believe that there could be a closed-head organic brain
injury in someone like Mr. Onyeabor unless there was loss of
consciousness, retrograde amnesia and positive findings on tests
such as the CT scan, the EEG, etc. (T. L-180:5, 24; 184:1-3;
185-6).

Therefore, counsel was compelled to hastily cross-

examine Dr. Clark on these issues based upon reference to learned
texts (T. L-172-192).

The doctor refused to acknowledge many of

the texts and the authors as authoritative (T. L-175:14), so the
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cross-examination was not as effective as it could have been had
counsel been able to learn the doctor's opinions in a prior
deposition and what texts he regarded as authoritative.
One of the most damaging aspects of Dr. Clark's
testimony was the diagnosis that Dr. Clark gave of Mr. Onyeabor
for the first time on cross-examination.

Dr. Clark was

questioned by plaintiff's counsel as to why there had been no
diagnosis in the report.

At that point, Dr. Clark diagnosed Mr.

Onyeabor's problems as a pre-existing personality disorder.

He

stated:
I could do that readily. I think it is
self-evident in terms of it being a
personality disorder with histrionic
features, and also explosive features as well.
And his hysteroid, it is a personality
disorder, other mixed type with histrionic,
and I agree, an explosive feature as well.
(Emphasis added) (Note: The actual
testimony was far more lucid; this passage
reflects some confusion by the reporter.)
(T. L-192:15).

Since the doctor brought that up, counsel was

forced to cross-examine on the issue (T. L-193-199).

This gave

Dr. Clark an additional opportunity to expound on Mr. Onyeabor's
allegedly pre-existing personality disorder (T. L-193-4).

This

would not have happened had Mr. Onyeabor's counsel had the prior
opportunity to learn the details of Dr. Clark's opinion in a
complete report.
Counsel's "rock and a hard place" situation in this
case is exactly what the rules of discovery were designed to
prevent.

Counsel was placed in the unenviable position of having

to either request a continuance and risk further damage to the
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client; take time out in the middle of a trial and try to prepare
a deposition of Dr. Clark at great disadvantage because of timing
and a very late report; or proceed with the trial examination and
do the best one could with the limited information available.
A continuance was out of the question because of the
client's mental health (see discussion above).

A mid-trial

deposition of a difficult, hostile expert witness was was
impractical.

It would have required significant preparation and

concentration to take a meaningful deposition of this particular
witness at this time.

To conduct a major trial requires all of

the energies of an attorney while in attendance at court during
the day, and in evaluation and preparation at night.

There is no

time left for the arduous task of preparing for and taking the
deposition of a difficult expert witness.

Dr. Clark is a

well-known, oft-used "defense psychiatrist" who has been asked to
be a witness by defense counsel many times during the past
several years (T. L-115:17-21; 115-116).
answered —

or didn't answer —

The way that Dr. Clark

the question of how many times he

had been a witness (T. L-116-118) is evidence of his skill as a
"a street-wise" defense witness.
If Dr. Clark had been a simple fact witness, the
situation would have been different.
would have been simple.

A mid-trial deposition

However, in the context of an

emotionally draining, time-consuming, 18-hour-a-day case such as
this, the possibility of taking a major deposition of an
important expert was an impossible task.

Counsel therefore was

required to pursue the course of the lesser evil, that of
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cross-examining Dr. Clark on the witness st^nd and hoping for the
best.
Courts generally refused to allow surprise experts
to testify in similar situations.

For example, in Hoover v. U.S.

Dept. of Interior, supra, the Court held that an opposing party
is entitled to discover the substance of the facts and the
opinions of the expected testimony.

"The primary purpose of this

required disclosure is to permit the opposing party to prepare an
effective cross-examination." (Emphasis added) _Id. at 1142. An
"effective cross-examination" is precisely what was denied
plaintiff with respect to Dr. Clark.

In the case of DeMarines v.

KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, supra, the defendant in an airline
decompression case called a doctor of whom no prior notice was
given, to testify that the plaintiff's condition resulted from
pre-existing causes (similar to Dr. Clark's testimony in this
case).

The plaintiff's counsel objected to this improper

testimony on the grounds that the report furnished to him by the
doctor did not contain any such diagnosis.

The trial judge

excluded the testimony ruling:
T am not going to permit that testimony if
there is not something [about the problem]
in this report because, frankly, the very
reason for handing over reports is so that
both sides will be aware of what is going on
and not be sprung any surprises. (Emphasis
added)
Id. at 1058.

The Court also noted the importance that all

parties be informed "before trial as to the substance of the
other party's expert testimony in order that he may be prepared
to meet this testimony and will not be surprised by it. " Id., at
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1059.

The appellate court, therefore, found no prejudicial error

in excluding the doctor's testimony.

Accord, Hadid v. Alexander,

supra; Sturdivant v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., supra (the Court
correctly refused to allow a party's medical expert to testify
where the party had claimed that although the medical expert had
been informally consulted previously, he had not been formally
retained until the day after the jury selection began; the Court
characterized this conduct as "tactical subterfuge," which
justified the sanction).
Hopefully Mrs. Bates will finally provide an
explanation in her brief as to why notice of Dr. Clark and a
report were not provided sooner.

Regardless of the reason,

however, the prejudice to Mr. Onyeabor is undeniable, and
warrants reversal and remand for a new trial.
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POINT III.
Erroneous Evidentiary Rulings
THE COURT WRONGFULLY EXCLUDED IMPORTANT EVIDENCE WHICH
AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW

The admission of legally inadmissible evidence is error
and presumed prejudicial.

Boy v. I.T.T. Grinnell Corp., 724 P.2d

612, 618 (Ariz.App. 1986).

The erroneous exclusion of evidence

is grounds for reversal if it appears that the excluded evidence
would have had a substantial influence in bringing about a
different verdict or finding.
(Utah 1983).

Hill v. Hartog, 658 P.2d 1206

A stricter standard of review is justified when the

erroneous rulings on evidence occurred in a jury trial.
v. Telia, 27 Utah 2d 261, 495 P.2d 310 (1972).

Arnovitz

If the error is

substantial enough that it is reasonable to believe that it
adversely affected the appellant or deprived him of a fair trial,
and in the absence of the error there is a reasonable likelihood
that the outcome would have been different, reversal is warranted.
Del Porto v. Nicolo, supra; Matter of Kessler, supra.
The improper exclusion of an expert in accident
reconstruction as to any relevant matter within the scope of that
expert's knowledge, justifies the granting of a new trial.
Reeves v. Markle, 579 P.2d 1382 (Ariz. 1978).

An expert witness

may be cross-examined regarding a medical textbook.
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A medical

treatise can also be used on direct and re-direct examination.
Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335 (Ariz.App. 1972).
allow a proper rebuttal witness is prejudicial error.

Failure to
Hall v.

Hall, 708 P.2d 416 (Wyo. 1985).
Prejudicial error should be presumed when admissible
evidence is excluded.

Dawson v. Associates Financial Service Co.

of Kansas, Inc., 529 P.2d 104 (Kan. 1974).

ARGUMENT
The court wrongfully excluded a great deal of important
evidence offered by plaintiff.

A few of the most important

points will be discussed at some length; the balance are referred
to in summary fashion.
A.

Exhibit 114f video tape of crash.

The court

excluded plaintiff's Exhibit 114, a video tape of a dummy in a
car striking a wall at 5 mph and 21 mph (T. C-146).

Plaintiff

had laid the foundation for this exhibit through Dennis Andrews,
a former highway patrolman and an accident reconstruction expert
with Rudi Limpertfs firm (T. C-122-128).

Mr. Andrews testified

that Mr. Onyeabor's vehicle was going approximately 35 mph at
impact (T. C-105-106) whereas the Bates1 vehicle was going
approximately 5 mph in a northerly direction at impact (T. C-108).
Mr. Andrews then explained the principles of relative motion that
apply to bodies in a car at the time of a sudden, deceleration
accident.

Mr. Andrews testified that the exhibit illustrated

this principle, despite the fact that it dealt with a wall crash
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rather than two vehicles in motion, because the principle
illustrated in both cases was sudden deceleration (T. C-125-126).
Mr. Andrews indicated that whether someone hit a wall, or another
significantly slower moving object, the principle of sudden
deceleration and what it would do to a body in the car were the
same (T. C-124-125; C-126:3-21).
The rejected video tape demonstrates graphically what
happened to the body of a dummy even in a 5 mph crash.

The

dummy's head made an approximate nine-inch bulls-eye pattern in
the windshield.

The video tape was important, relevant evidence

in the case because the defense constantly took the position that
Mr. Onyeabor's accident was not substantial enough to cause the
injuries complained of by Mr. Onyeabor (T. A-15:16f L-102:6-12,
0-18:7-19).

The defense also tried to prove that Mr. Onyeabor

probably didn't hit his head during the accident sequence (T.
A-13-14, D-421).

A head trauma is relevant to prove closed-head

brain injury (T. D-391:16).

The video would have shown that a

sudden deceleration at the speeds involved in Mr. Onyeabor's
accident could have easily caused his head injury.

Therefore,

the judge committed a serious error in excluding this evidence.
Plaintiff's offer of Exhibit 114 does not run afoul of
the hearsay rule.

It was being offered as illustrative of Mr.

Andrews' testimony, i.e., to show the principles of motion to
which Mr. Andrews had testified.
two-minute series of photographs.

The video is essentially a
A photograph which is

qualified by expert testimony and is a reasonably accurate
depiction of a relevant matter is often us$d to illustrate the
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testimony of a witness.

Appropriate photographs make testimony

more readily understood by the trier of fact.
is admissible and not hearsay.
(9th Cir. 1980).

Such a photograph

U.S. v. May, 622 F.2d 1000f 1007

A video tape demonstration is admissible to

illustrate principles that form an expert opinionf even though
the circumstances of the actual event were different.

Gladhill

v. General Motors Corp., 743 F.2d 1049, 1051 (4th Cir. 1984).
B.
of treatises.

Refusal and reluctance to allow examination by use
On numerous occasions, the court erroneously

prohibited or seriously hindered Mr. Onyeabor's counsel from
either establishing a treatise as authoritative or using it to
rebut testimony raised by a defense expert.

The most egregious

example of this occurred during the rebuttal testimony of Dr.
Linda Gummow during the eleventh day of trial.

In the previous

week, Dr. Clark had testified for the defense that a loss of
consciousness is required to have a legitimate closed-head
organic brain injury (T. L-77-79), and that substantially all of
the learned literature in the field substantiated that point (T.
L-109:l, 22; 178:18).

Mr. Onyeabor's counsel posed that same

question to Dr. Linda Gummow on rebuttal (T. M-32-36), and asked
about the scientific literature.

Dr. Gummow indicated that the

scientific literature did not support Dr. Clark's proposition (T.
M-32), and she was preparing to quote from treatises to rebut Dr.
Clark when the court refused to allow it, stating:
THE COURT: Well, I don't think that on
her rebuttal testimony here I am going to let
her read from documents that have not been
previously considered. ...
THE COURT: To now say we are going to
bring in additional witnesses to read
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additional excerpts from treatises that were
not mentioned before, I don't think that's
proper.
(T. M-33-34).

Rule 803(18), Utah Rules of Evidence, however,

permits an expert to be examined with treatises.

In this

particular case, Mr. Onyeabor's counsel was trying to show that
Dr. Clark was unfamiliar with the learned literature, which he
had claimed to know

(T. M-34:12-15.

Since the adoption of the

Uniform Rules of Evidence, such statements read from an
authoritative medical text are admissible ak substantive evidence
in the case.

Jenkins v. Parish, 627 P.2d 533, 539 (Utah 1981).

The court ultimately let Dr. Gummow read some of the
articles (T. M-37-39), but only if she would first state her
opinion and then use the treatise to buttress it.

The court's

unnecessary argumentation and circumscription ruined the
strategic impact of counsel's cross-examination.
The issue of a medical text arose again a few minutes
later when Dr. Gummow intended to read part of DSM III (a
psychiatric diagnostic manual) to rebut somfe of Dr. Clark's
diagnosis testimony on personality disorder (T. M-49-53).

The

judge sustained the objection, prohibiting Dr. Gummow from simply
reading a passage which clearly rebuts Dr. Clark's diagnosis (T.
M-50).

Once again, the court prejudicially blunted the sharp

focus prepared by counsel to rebut Dr. Clark's erroneous
testimony.
The judge also committed error with respect to the use
of treatises on at least three other occasions during the
examination of Dr. Gerald Moress (T. D-444-445; D-452), and again
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during an earlier examination of Dr. Gummow (T. F-841-2).
Refusal to allow authentication of treatises was grounds for
reversal in Jenkins v. Parish, supra at 538-539.

The Court

stated:
The lower court's failure to allow plaintiff
to independently authenticate professional
works and consequently to use them on crossexamination of an adverse expert witness who
professed no knowledge of the works resulted
in prejudicial error by substantially
curtailing plaintiff's ability to attack the
testimony of Dr. Parish.
Id. at 539.

The refusal to allow authentication and the

hindering of authentication was strategically harmful to Mr.
Onyeabor's examination of Dr. Clark.

Dr. Clark simply refused to

acknowledge the authoritativeness of the texts in general,
insisting that he be directed to certain chapters or passages
(T. L-175:14).
C.

The court thus committed reversible error.
Exclusion of important rebuttal witnesses.

The

court excluded the testimony of Joseph Johnson, Ph.D., and Devra
Garfinkle, Ph.D., two professors that taught Mr. Onyeabor at the
University of Utah (T. M-97-102).

A proffer was made (T. M-98).

The professors would have rebutted Dr. Clark's statements that
Mr. Onyeabor's complaints suggesting brain injury began when
Onyeabor's current counsel, Mr. Sykes, got involved in the case
(T. L-148:9-17).

Drs. Johnson and Garfinkle were prepared to say

that they noticed sequelae of a brain injury long before Mr.
Sykes got involved in the case.

It was error to exclude such

testimony.
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D.

Evidence of plaintiff's plans for the future.

The

court refused to allow Elizabeth Onyeabor, plaintiff's wife, to
testify regarding their plans for the future if there had been no
accident (T. J-143).

The evidence was relevant to future earning

capacity because it went to the issue of the types of jobs that
Mr. Onyeabor could expect to holdf and it helped determine the
value of the loss.

The court labeled Mrs. Onyeabor's testimony

as hearsay and speculation.

In sustaining the objection, the

court said, "And he's the one to tell us what his future plans
were."

(T. J-143:18).

Ironically, when Mr. Onyeabor was later

called and asked the question put to his wife earlier, the court
sustained a defense objection again (T. M-3-4).

It was error on

both occasions.
E.

Officer's opinion on fault.

The court refused to

allow Officer Leavitt to testify, based upoh his investigation,
as to who was at fault in causing the accident (T. B-59-62).
Officer Leavitt had established himself as an expert in the field
of accident investigation with many years hands-on experience in
the area.

Under Rules 702 and 704, his testimony should have

been admissible.

In Kelsay v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 749 F.2d

437 (7th Cir. 1984), the Court held that it was proper for a
police officer who investigated a train-car crash to opine that
it resulted from driving inattention.

Accord:

Gladhill v.

General Motors Corp., supra (police officer who arrived at scene
of accident was properly permitted to testify that accident
resulted from failure to drive within a single lane, and that the
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accident might have been caused by lack of familiarity with the
vehicle).
The prejudice in the exclusion of this testimony is
obvious.

Under the facts of this case, astoundingly, the jury

found Mr. Onyeabor to be 25% negligent (see discussion in Point
IV below).
F.

Exhibit 75, a purchase order.

The court excluded

Exhibit 75, a purchase order for a substantial amount of money
issued to Mr. Onyeabor's company in Nigeria (App. 42) offered to
show that he had a substantive business in Nigeria (T. G-152).
The defense objected on grounds of relevance, which the court
sustained (T. G-152:23-24).

However, the exhibit was certainly

relevant because the defense took the position throughout the
trial that Mr. Onyeabor was not particularly successful (T.
L-94-96, 0-34-39) inferring that the company probably belonged to
his brother, and that Mr. Onyeabor probably worked for his
brother (T. L-94-95).

The purchase order tended to substantiate

Mr. Onyeabor's substantial lost earning capacity.

775/P3
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POINT IV.
Erroneous Jury Instruction
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT MR.
ONYEABOR COULD BE FOUND TO BE CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT
AND A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. THERE WAS
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON WHICH THE JURY COULD BASE SUCH
A FINDING.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW
An erroneous jury instruction which tends to mislead
the jury or insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the
law, is prejudicial error, Estate of Kesler, supra, if it is
clear that a correct application would have produced different
results.

Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410

(Utah 1983).

The adversely affected party is entitled to have

the matter adjudicated under correct principles of law.
420.

_Id. at

An erroneous instruction is presumptively harmful and

ground for reversal unless it affirmatively appears in the record
as a whole that the error was not prejudicial.

Agee v. Kahului

Trucking and Storage, Inc., 688 P.2d 256 (Hawaii 1984); Rowley v.
Graven Bros, and Co., 491 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1971).

One Utah case

characterized the issue as whether the parties were given a fair
trial and had the issues of fact and applicable law presented in
a clear and understandable manner.

Callahan v. Wood, 24 Utah 2d.

8, 465 P.2d 169, 171 (1970).
To successfully attack a jury verdict on the grounds of
insufficient evidence, the appellant must marshall all of the
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evidence supporting the verdict and then demonstrate that, even
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict,
the evidence is insufficient to support it.

Cambelt Int'l. Corp.

v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1987).
Generally, factual disputes are matters left to the
jury.

However, if the evidence on an issue so clearly

preponderates in favor of the appellant that reasonable people
would not differ on the outcome of the case, then reversible
error has been committed.

E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency,

Inc. v. W.C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983).

The

appellant has a heavy burden to establish that the evidence does
not support the jury's verdict and the factual findings implicit
in that verdict.

The evidence will be considered in a light most

favorable to the verdict, and it will not be overturned when it
is supported by substantial and competent evidence.

Von Hake v.

Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985).

ARGUMENT
The court's instructions 21, 20 and 16 (R. 640, 639 and
634; App. 43) tell the jury that they can find the plaintiff
negligent with respect to the facts of this case, for allegedly
failing to keep a proper lookout or for driving too fast for
existing conditions.

Plaintiff's counsel objected strenuously to

these instructions (T. N-6-8), and specifically to anything in
the instructions that dealt with plaintiff's alleged negligence
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(T. N-7:21-22).

Plaintiff proposed that language be added to the

instructions to the effect that the law doe£ not require that a
driver slow down when approaching an intersection (T. N-8:4-6),
but that was rejected by the court.
There is no dispute on the critical aspects of the
evidence regarding Mr. Onyeabor's approach to the accident scene
on the day in question.

He was driving at or under the speed

limit (T. B-58); he was completely within his own lane
(T. B-55:20-25; Ex. 5:2); there were no particular hazards on the
road or hazardous traffic patterns (T. L-16:19); Mrs. Bates
claimed she didn't see Mr. Onyeabor because he was partially
obscured by another vehicle (T. B-47; Ex. 5:2, 4); she proceeded
to travel almost due west from a private drive across three
northbound lanes to the point of impact (T. B-50; K-49:12); at
most, Mr. Onyeabor had between three-quarte|rs of one second and
one second to react to Mrs. Bates' illegal turn before he began
his skid, and 1.8 to 2 seconds total in reaction and skid time
before impact (T. C-114-115); and Mr. Onyeabor was between 250
and 300 feet from the intersection when Mrs. Bates inaugurated
the accident sequence (T. C-115-117, K-49:20, C-74-75; Ex. 4).
There was simply no evidence from which onq could rationally
conclude that Mr. Onyeabor was negligent.
The only evidence developed by the defense to impute
contributory negligence to Mr. Onyeabor came by way of the
testimony of Mr. Frank Grant, the defense accident reconstruction
expert.

He testified as follows:
Q (Mr. Stegall): ... Were you able to
form an opinion as to why the accident
happened?
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A (Mr. Grant): Yes.
Q. What is that opinion?
A. Bates entered the roadway, made a
wide right turn so to speak; Mr. Onyeabor was
traveling too fast to be able to adjust his
speed in time to avoid her.
Q. Are there factors at the
intersection relating to the speed of the
Onyeabor vehicle with regard to your
statement of "too fast"?
A. Yes. I am a little concerned about
the speed of a vehicle approaching an
intersection that is as close as the
intersection of Fort Union Boulevard. It is
about 100 at the point of impact; is less,
much less than 100 feet from the stop line at
Fort Union Boulevard. And given the
information that I had about the density
of the traffic at that particular time, the
type of traffic at that particular time, and
the intersection, I am a little concerned
about why would a vehicle still be going at
45 miles an hour that close to an
intersection. (Emphasis added)
(T. K-49-50).

That opinion by Mr. Grant was totally without

foundation and contrary to the facts.

Mrs. Bates herself

testified as follows:
So I stopped there to look to see if there
was (sic) any cars coming. T saw a white
van, and I had plenty of time, so I pulled
out into the lane and I looked to make sure
again, and I pulled into the next lane, and
that's when the collision was. (Emphasis
added)
(T. L-16:19).

Thus, even Mrs. Bates did not allege any

particular hazards on the road because there was only one other
vehicle and she had "plenty of time."

She even checked twice.

Therefore, according to Mrs. Bates' testimony, not only was the
intersection not busy, there were no particular hazards.
There is no evidence that the intersection had anything
to do with the accident.

Mr. Grant did not point out any
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specific hazards or "existing conditions" at the location on the
day in question that would militate a reduced speed.

He vaguely

implied that the intersection was generally known to be busy (T.
K-49:21-3), which seems irrelevant given Mrs. Bates1 testimony.
He was "a little concerned" about the speed of a vehicle as it
approached that intersection; however, one would need to know
specific information about hazards to say whether that was a safe
speed on the day and moment in question.

There was absolutely

nothing pointed out to the jury to indicate that it wasn't a safe
speed!

Unless the defense could show some specific hazard of

which Mr. Onyeabor should have been aware and which should have
caused him to slow down, there was no basis for claiming that he
was negligent.

Allowing that issue to go to the jury was simply

an invitation to speculate on evidence not in the record.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that had Mr. Onyeabor been
driving slower, the accident could have been avoided.

As pointed

out in Mr. Andrews' testimony, even if Mr. Onyeabor had been
driving 40 mph, there still would have been a collision.

(T.

C-120).
Additionally, there is nothing in the Utah statutes
which indicates that a driver cannot go the speed limit while
approaching or crossing an intersection.
§41-6-46(l)(a) (as amended 1987).

U.C.A. 1953

Tt is uncontested that the

speed limit applicable to Mr. Onyeabor was 45 mph (T. B-58,
K-43:6), and even the defense did not claim that Mr. Onyeabor was
exceeding the speed limit (T. K-43-46).
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Essentially, the defense failed to prove any fact that
would allow a reasonable juror to conclude that Mr. Onyeabor
was driving too fast for conditions or failing to keep a proper
lookout.

It further failed to prove that even if Mr. Onyeabor

was somehow negligent, he was a proximate cause of the accident.
The fact of the matter is that the jury was simply allowed to
speculate.

The jury's prejudice against Mr. Onyeabor was

demonstrated by the verdict.

Under the circumstances recounted

above, it found Mr. Onyeabor to be 25% negligent.
astounding result!

The verdict should be reversed.

775/P4
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That is an

POINT V.
Additur or New Trial
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING MR.
ONYEABOR AN ADDITUR. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING MR. ONYEABOR'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND
APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW
Generally, the amount of a jury verdict is a matter
exclusively for the jury.

This is not so, however, where the

award clearly indicates the jury's disregard of competent
evidence or the influence of passion or prejudice.
Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1978).

Batty v.

An additur is justified if

it seems clear that the jury has misapplied or failed to take
into account proven facts; or misunderstood or disregarded the
law; or made findings clearly against the weight of the evidence.
Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961).
An appellate court should reverse! a trial court's
failure to grant a motion for a new trial only if the trial court
abused its discretion.
264 (1952).

Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d

A trial judge may grant a new trial only if the

jury's verdict is so contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence that the judge "cannot in good conscience permit it to
stand."

Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 441, 326 P.2d 722, 726

(1958) (concurring opinion of Crockett and Wade, JJ); Goddard v.
Hickman, 685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984).
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The judge should order a new

trial in those rare cases when the jury verdict is manifestly
against the weight of the evidence.

Goddardf supra at 532.

ARGUMENT
- The Back Injury There was undisputed evidence that Mr. Onyeabor
suffered a herniated lumbar disc as a proximate result of the
accident.

This was admitted by the defense orthopedic expert,

Dr. Edward Spencer (T. 1-10:19), who gave Mr. Onyeabor a 10%
permanent partial impairment rating (T. 1-19).

On

cross-examination, Dr. Spencer admitted that the Manual for
Orthopedic Surgeons in Evaluating Permanent Physical Impairment,
published by the American Academy for Orthopedic Surgeons, was
authoritative (T. 1-32), and that the most likely scenario for
Mr. Onyeabor, under that rating system, would indicate a 20%
permanent partial impairment for a herniated disc (T. 1-33-34).
Dr. Thomas Soderberg, a well-known orthopedic surgeon, rated Mr.
Onyeabor's permanent impairment from the herniated disc at 20%
without surgery and 10% with surgery, if the surgery was
successful (T. D-362).

(Dr. Soderberg also gave Mr. Onyeabor a

10% permanent partial impairment rating due to his neck injury
suffered in the accident (T. D-362).)

Dr. Gerald Moress, a

prominent Salt Lake neurologist, gave Mr. Onyeabor a 10%
permanent partial impairment due to the herniated disc, if the
surgery were successful (T. D-410), but a 20% permanent partial
impairment if the surgery were not successful and he did not
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expect it to be successful because of Mr. Onyeabor's lack of
emotional stability (T. D-411-412).
Mr. Onyeabor received a verdict from the jury for
$16,850.00 (R. 663), almost exactly the amount suggested by Mr.
Stegall in his closing argument (T. O-34-40).

It is common

knowledge that a herniated disc case has a value of $40,000 to
$50,000 to settle in Salt Lake County.

The amount of the

verdict, considering just the back injury alone, suggests passion
and prejudice by the jury, and is grossly inadequate.
- The Brain Injury Three doctors testified for plainltiff who are qualified
to evaluate permanent impairment from a brain injury. Dr.
Moress, a neurologist, testified that Mr. Onyeabor's impairment
for the brain injury was 35%, for a total df 42% when combined
with the back injury (T. D-417).

Dr. Richard Goka, a Salt Lake

physiatrist (a specialist in rehabilitation medicine), and the
medical director at the Department of Rehabilitation Medicine at
Holy Cross Hospital, considered the brain Injury impairment to be
36% (T. E-538).

Dr. Duncan Wallace, a Salt Lake psychiatrist and

the former president of the Utah Psychiatric Association (T.
E-651), indicated that Mr. Onyeabor's permanent overall
impairment due to the brain injury was 34% (T. F-710:23).
The defense produced no substantial, believable
evidence to the effect that Mr. Onyeabor did not have a brain
injury due to the accident.

Dr. Robert Cook, the defense

psychologist, admittedly had little or no experience in the area
of head injury.

He was not familiar with any of the major texts
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on head injury (T. K-121).

At his deposition, Dr. Cook was asked

the following question, which was read to him at trial:
Mr. Sykes: "So you feel that you're not
qualified to do a primary examination to
determine if someone is organically brain
injured"?
Answer: "Yes, I would say that."
(Emphasis added)
(T. K-125:8; Cook deposition p. 39:5).

Dr. Cook further admitted

that organic brain injury was not one of his "specialties" (T. K124:9-25).

Dr. Cook was not familiar with brain injury

terminology (T. K-123-124, K-126-127, K-128:20, K-129:6,
K-129:22, K-130:13).

Seventy-five percent of Dr. Cook's

professional income came from doing court evaluations for defense
attorneys and insurance companies (T. K-134:6).

In the ten years

prior to his testimony, Dr. Cook had seen perhaps 12 or 13
patients who had brain damage, but did not see them or treat them
for that purpose (T. K-137-138:2).

In fact, Dr. Cook had never

even treated anybody for organic brain injury (T. K-138:6).

In

summary, it would have been very difficult for a fair jury to
give much credence to any opinion that Dr. Cook had on the issue
of brain injury.
Dr. Lincoln Clark testified very cogently to the effect
that Mr. Onyeabor did not have organic brain injury (T. L-101102).

Undoubtedly, Dr. Clark was a main reason for the jury's

low verdict.

Dr. Clark should not have been allowed to testify

on brain injury (see discussion in Point II above).

Even so, his

opinion should have been of questionable value to an unprejudiced
jury.

In a March, 1986, trial, he had not considered himself to
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be a "specialist" on brain injury (T. L-113,114).

He had only

become an expert in his own mind through court cases that he had
during that intervening year (T. L-114).

H^ credited plaintiff's

counsel, Mr. Sykes, with having helped him to become an expert in
the area (T. L-114).
The verdict reflects the jury's belief that Mr.
Onyeabor did not have a head injury.

That is obviously a result

of the prejudice engendered by a combination of the judge's
comments on the evidence, judicial interjections and
interruptions, erroneous evidentiary rulingls and instructions,
and perhaps other latent prejudices.

The Court would be

justified in granting Mr. Onyeabor's Motion for an Additur in an
amount far in excess of $200,000^, the amount originally
requested.

This is fair, and preferable td granting a new trial.

Mr. Onyeabor expended (or incurred liabilities) in excess of
$30,000 in costs to prepare and try the case, plus $6,500 for
appellate transcripts.

Absent the prejudice engendered by the

numerous comments on the evidence and otheif errors, Mr. Onyeabor
certainly would have had a verdict in excess of $200,000, that
being a low amount.

Therefore, rather than burden the Court

system with a re-trial of this case, the Cpurt should simply
grant a reasonable additur.

Tn the alternative, the Court should

grant a new trial because the evidence was insufficient to
justify the verdict.
1 / Mr. Onyeabor turned down a settlement offer of $125,000 prior
to trial.
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CONCLUSION
The lower court made in excess of 40 comments on the
evidence by way of direct statements and/or unwarranted
interjections and interruptions.

Many of these comments were

extremely prejudicial and tended to cast Mr. Onyeabor's experts
and evidence in substantial disrepute in the eyes of the jury.
The court unduly interfered with Mr. Onyeabor's presentation of
evidence and cross-examination of witnesses.

The court's

demeanor and body language during the trial demonstrated
favoritism toward the defendants' case, and communicated the
court's belief that the quality and credibility of Mr. Onyeabor's
evidence was lacking.

This caused Mr. Onyeabor extreme prejudice

and denied him a fair trial.
Dr. Clark's reappearance in the case as an expert
witness for the defense was a surprise which Mr. Onyeabor could
not have guarded against in the exercise of reasonable caution.
Lack of notice of Dr. Clark as a witness and failure to provide a
timely, complete report appear to have been the result of
contumacious conduct, and should not be sanctioned by the Court.
It denied Mr. Onyeabor the right to effective cross-examination,
and significantly prejudiced his case.
There were numerous evidentiary errors, including the
erroneous exclusion of relevant admissible evidence and improper
jury instructions.

Mr. Onyeabor was thereby prejudiced.
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Each of

the erroneous exclusions of evidence, or other evidentiary
errors, constituted reversible error.
The cumulative effect of the comments on the evidence,
the judicial interruptions, the admission of Dr. Clark's
testimony, and the evidentiary errors was devastating to the
Mr. Onyeabor's case.
The Court should grant Mr. Onyeabpr's Motion for an
Additur in a reasonable amount.

This would( avoid the wasteful

necessity of trying the case again.

In the alternative, the

Court should reverse the trial court and remand this case for a
new trial on all issues.
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1988|•

ROBERr B. S Y K E S " 7 C
Attorney for Appellant
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